To be fair, those two realms of ethical issues and strategic efficiency are intimately intertwined. If waging a war necessitates to frame narratives toward a broader range of audiences, it also implies that « winning » is achievable once those audiences become convinced that political objectives are met, even if partially, and that  our will has been imposed on the adversary (which is less than evident in case of actors pursuing absolute goals). Yet, the American strategic imagination is mainly idealistic in its mainstream current: war is waged according to values. Furthermore, the set of norms and rules established and enforced through the US Hegemony, even if it proves elastic at some times, constrains military actions and strategic decision. That implies that ethical and legal issues arising from the use of armed drones in at least nominally sovereign states may have strategic consequences. Put it otherwise: the tactical efficiency of drones has to be considered in the right way, as a temporary achievement and not as a silver bullet, because of the potential unintended consequences on the long run and the risk of « Pyrrhic victory ».

How to deal with a threat? the use of drones as strategic choice

In order to understand the use of armed drones by the Obama administration, one has to consider the significance it is endowed by political and military leaders. It seems obvious that the tactics of ‘targeted killings’ is a legacy of 9/11 and of the way the Bush administration choose to perceive and act against the threat posed by AQ’s bomb attacks. In other words, in order to deal with that threat, the American national security apparatus developped a set of tactics organized around « finding, fixing, finishing » AQ’s leadership. But in a sense, those tactics – and the eventual strategy of dealing with AQ & affiliates through attrition and decapitation – emerged mainly from a set of bureaucracies and small coalitions of individuals across the governmental agencies. That implies that when Obama inherited that structure and its procedures to deal with the perceived threat, he chose to progressively centralize the decision-making process with regards to how to deal with discovered militants leaders in often remote areas. In a pragmatic way, the president allowed to develop a process relying on the selective use of force in order to both decrease political and human costs and increase the systemic effects on ‘extremists’ organizations and movements. To be fair, drones weren’t at the time the most effective way to deal with that threat: JSOC raids were more efficient because they focused on capture or, at least, gathering and analysis of elements retrieved from those raids. Yet, the most important point is that both Obama and John Brennan, as his top counter-terrorism adviser, have been willing to assert a more centralized command and control in order to avoid letting those programs living their own lives.

Put otherwise: the choice to rely on drones is a partial answer to the inherent dilemma in dealing with AQ and its affiliates. Indeed, on the one hand, the US still perceive AQ as a threat, whether existential or not, and – in a broader way – as a threat to global and regional stability. In addition, the very « zero-risk » culture which permeates the realm of politics in the US implies that no president can afford to let a plot develop and succeed. On the other hand, the costly decade of occupations in both Afghanistan and Iraq seems to be interpreted by policymakers as the path to avoid in the near future. Within that framework, drones and covert operations (embedded in a broader « small footprint » approach) appear as the less despicable solution.

The consequences of secrecy: 

To be fair, there are several reasons which explain the secrecy surrounding the drone wars. Many are obvious, since the program is run by agencies accustomed to operate in secrecy and since it has been designed as a covert operation (even if it is not a « pure » CA because of a shift toward a deterrence approach and also because it has become critical to show the US is still able to strike its enemies). Other reasons are less: in order to operate efficiently, drones have to benefit from either complicity or tacit agreement from local governments; furthermore, there’s an operational need to protect local sources and operators on the ground. And of course, since the very process of selecting targets and authorizing the use of force lies somewhere in a near-constitutional « grey area », it appeared critical for the administration to restrict public access to both processes and justifications.

Problem is when that  covert program is fully disclosed to the various audiences whom it was intended to remain secret. To be fair, it seems that compartmentalizing several activities within the military and broader « national security » realm is somewhat easier than one would expect. But, once disclosed, there’s understandably a high risk of political backlash,  all the more that that program (and the aerial platform it is supposed to be organized around, even if it obscures the very importance of more conventional assets in targeting « militants ») bears with it a lot of fears and expectations drawn from American popular culture regarding robots and artificial intelligence.

HAL 9000

For now, it seems that concerns regarding civilians  - while outlined by  reports  released last fall on casualties and the impact of strikes – has less coverage in the US press than the issue of targeting American citizens. If it’s the case, despite apparent popular support for the use of drones in order to deal with AQ (a survey from last Spring shows that 62% of Americans approve it), it could be a potential risk. But it seems likely to be a constitutional matter between the Congress and the President, the former trying to balance what appears to some as unprecedented life-and-death powers in the hands of the latter. Put otherwise: the request for a greater accountability draws on popular fear regarding what is seen as a discretionary and somewhat arbitrary power to execute an American citizen but has to be understood as a move to constrain the executive branch on National Security matters.

Drones: the US’ face to the world?

Source: Los Angeles Times

Embedding the use of drones in the foreign policy analysis (and a broader IR perspective) looks like similar debates with regards to the use of cyber attacks. Indeed, it seems that one unintended consequence of the use of drones is that it is more and more equated with Obama’s strategy and even foreign policy. Hence a critical reflection:

In a hierarchical world, the significance of an offensive use of a new weapon/asset by the hegemonic power is twofold. On the one hand, that use highlights the hierarchical nature of power relations (both in terms of material power and of normative discrimination). Put otherwise, not only the US can afford to use drones without being threatened by a similar use by other states on its territory, but it is also able to rely on drones due to hierarchical relations with local governments. On the other hand, that same move can trigger resistance and reluctance from other countries and societies because it reveals the true nature of power relations (and, to some, the true nature of what is too often depicted as an « American domination of the world »). In short, the use of drones may feed hostile narratives.

Source: Pew Research Center

And here, civilian casualties and the impact of drones « persistent presence » matter a lot. First because of the sometimes inaccuracy of ‘signature strikes’ (assuming that military-aged men killed in strike are not ‘collateral damages’). But war being a messy and nasty realm, mostly because those strikes could prove counterproductive on the long run if their tactical prowess would be cancelled by their political impact on local societies.

Conclusion: the illusion of the control of force

The use of drone strikes as a tool in a strategy of disruption, decapitation and attrition in order to deal with Al-Qaeda is the result of a choice. Of course, like every choice, it bears with it risks, dangers and pitfalls. For instance if that tactics would lead to identify the strategy (and the policy, even the policymaker behind it) with the tool. Given the fantasy surrounding it, it seems likely that that would lead to undermine broader goals.

But there’s another illusion  yet not analyzed here, namely the very notion that, once unleashed, lethal force – even used in a selective way – could really be controlled and its consequences mastered. In a sense, The Onion depicted in an humorous way the very metaphor of drones escaping their masters.

Stéphane Taillat

1. a failure to assess the threat on its own right (by labeling « terrorists » any insurgent or ethnoseparatist movement)
2. a failure to see how legitimacy (and especially that of the local government) should preclude any long term commitment
3. a failure to recognize the limited role our military forces should play in unlocking the tactical situation in order to let local dynamics freely develop
4. a failure to plan an exit strategy which would amounts to a greater  political freedom of action

The second is from Olivier Roy – a world known scholar on Muslim societies – in Le Monde: his main argument highlights the dilemma raised by the characterization of the enemy as an irreconcilable terrorist. Indeed, by labeling the adversary as a unitary actor, one would ignore the more complex political and social dynamics at play, thus precluding any chance to disrupt AQ by letting the local actors whom it tries to be a parasite to give up their protection. Put otherwise: that would prevent any opportunity to collaborate with less extremists actors whose agendas are more amenable to compromise.

Of course, both articles have strong argument, and I share them for a large part. But I disagree with each on two points:

1) The conditions outlined by Olivier Zajec are too idealistic. In other words, they preclude any intervention or stabilization on the basis that they are not likely to be met in the real world. To be fair, those four principles could be met, but only during the course of the operation.

2) hence my second point: those two pieces (and especially Zajec’s) seem to ignore the necessity to study strategy in a dialectical way. A strategy of exit, tactical operations which would unlock the situation and even a fair and autonomous analysis of the enemy would depend on the adversary’s strategy, its capabilities and its own political freedom of action and capability to unlock the situation on the ground. Iraq is a good example: the ’07-’08 surge unlocked the military situation and let local dynamics develop with a relatively low US pressure and inducement. But to be fair, during the surge, US needed to pressure, induce, persuade and leverage the various political actors (first and foremost Prime Minister Maliki). On the other hand, both pieces fail to fully recognize AQ’s strategy to embed itself in the locals’ very social fabric: when Roy uses the analogy with a parasite, he seems to forget that it is more than that. Jihadists often use gaps and fault lines, first seducing but also using coercion and intimidation in order to establish their social and political order. Of course, local societies may be tempted to rise against foreign fighters, but as the failed 2005 revolt in Anbar should demonstrate, it is likely to be crushed without external alliance (in that case, the successful alliance between several cheiks and the US military at fall ’06).

To me, closing the gap (that is, in Odierno’s words, to boost the host-government legitimacy) is a far more realistic way, under certain circumstances, than closing the doors (letting local dynamics creating more chaos and instability). The colonial era is over, and thus no western country can stabilize alone: it has to build coalitions both outside and inside the targeted state’s society. But on the other hand, as we are in a hierarchical world (maybe it could be or even it should be otherwise, but it is not), western states are the most powerful and hence have more chances to assert their interests than local states. In that perspective, if such a state (or its leaders) perceives that it has stakes and interests to intervene and stabilize, and if it calculates that the obstacles and anticipated costs are low enough to allow that, it is likely that it will act accordingly. Eventually, by doing so, it is also likely that the best course would be to help build the legitimacy of the local government. It is obviously a dilemma, since an external-imposed legitimacy is more difficult to enforce and sustain, but no dilemma can be resolved by starting from what the world should be rather than what it really is…

To some, it appeared as a good news: from now on, it would be possible to rely on military force to enforce the liberal order and, in a somewhat romanticism way, wage war for the salvation of innocent civilians. For others, that success triggered concerns that western power (and maybe others) would use Libya as a precedent in order to legitimate any intervention.

But neither occurred. On the contrary, the messy civil war in Syria and the brutal repression exerted on the population by Bacher Al Assad have not seen yet a western intervention. Proponents and opponents of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have then argued that that situation of « double standards » is another proof of western states’ cynicism.

Underlying this assumption is a fundamentally flawed perception of what is intervention in the strategic realm and, moreover, what is its meaning in today’s international relations.

R2P and « just war »: a case for intervention

As Jean-Baptiste Jengène-Vilmer argued in an insightful article in July, R2P is frequently misled as a legitimating tool to intervene. In fact, R2P is neither a duty nor a free-hand given to a particular state in order to violate the norm of sovereignty upon which the international political system rests. More accurately, it could be depicted both as a condition for sovereign states to be recognized as such and as a right given to external actors, under certain circumstances, to act under UN mandate to interfere in the internal affairs of another state in order to protect its civilians.

In short, R2P functions more like the « just war » doctrine as a set of criteria to discern when and how going to war. It is worth remembering that « just war » is not only about a « just cause » but also about consequences: war is deemed « just » when its expected consequences is not to add more harm or to aggravate the conflict. Put otherwise, that implies intervention is neither a tool of last resort nor a task to be performed in every situation where civilian population is put at risk by a specific government.

Values and interests:

States, and especially great powers, are thus more prone to intervene when there’s a strong consensus among them to do so (in the case of « humanitarian intervention ») or when they have both the power and high perceived stakes to act (in the case of « regime change »). Put simply, intervention is function of a particular actor’s logic. That logic rests upon a balance between perceived interests and perceived values. Both matter: values are often framing the way a particular conflict is inscribed into that actor’s interests, and interests are of course what drive the actor to include intervention in its strategic opportunities.  It is critical to make that point because values and interests are more often than not perceived as opposed and sometimes conflicting categories. In most cases, there’s a necessity to balance between them rather than to oppose them. In the case of France in Libya, values and interests are melted to a point that is nearly impossible to really separate them. Indeed, France was willing to assert its role as both a Mediterranean power and a promoter of Democracy. On the domestic stage, intervening was also seen as an opportunity driven by the perceived necessity to act in order to restore the president’s image.

But if either values and interests shape the stakes in a particular situation, they have to be balanced with obstacles and potential costs in a strategic calculus. In a sense, Libya presented only a few obstacles: for France, the necessity to frame public opinion and international audience to present intervention as neither a post-colonial move nor a casualties-creating conflict. Those obstacles (mainly internal) drove the way France chose to intervene. That’s not to say that public opinion really mattered as an objective obstacle. On the contrary, it is worth saying that public opinion was seen by political and military elites at the time as either a potential multiplier of legitimacy or a potential constraint in case France would suffer casualties.

In the case of Syria, obstacles are much more important and constraining. First, there are those constraints emanating from the international stage (i.e. the opposition of both China and Russia at the UNSC). Second, political elites are not willing to rely on direct military force and subsequent occupation to deal with Syria. That may be explained by either the interpretation of the last decade’s interventions or by political elites’ perceptions of costs overcoming benefits. Put another way: stakes and interests are not seen as sufficient to risk military or political backlash on either the domestic or the international stage. Third of course, military operations would prove much more difficult in Syria than in Libya, for a great range of reasons.

Moreover, consequences matter: there are growing concerns that an intervention in Syria, while desirable in the light of many interests or values, would lead to unintended and unwanted aftermaths.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 seems to prove that when stakes are high enough, political elites in the world’s most powerful actor can overcome perceived obstacles. On the international stage, the US was able to do it because of its unchallenged capabilities. On the domestic stage, the aftermath of 9/11 allowed the administration to secure a large support in favor of the intervention.

In short, interventions are much likely to occur when stakes and capabilities are higher than dealing with both external and internal constraints. That’s obvious, but that has two implications. First, context matters of course. But second, the way political elites perceive the desirability of a particular course of action seems to be more important than objective constraints.

Beyond intervention:

Those points highlight the fact that Libya has not become the precedent some feared (or hoped) to be. Political elites in most western countries seem to perceive much higher costs and difficulties to intervene in Syria.

It is more likely that, in the near future, western states will choose another course of action, absent the very conditions that allowed the intervention in Libya to be  decided, waged and successfully put to an end. In reality, the alternative is not a binary one: between intervening or doing nothing.

States could choose to manage conflicts, humanitarian catastrophes or so-called « rogue states » instead. That’s not to say that we are returning back to the 9/11 era. In many ways, western elites have learnt many lessons from that period. On the other hand, they’ve also drawn wrong lessons from the last decade, especially with regards to which effects military force may and can achieve.

Managing those situations would mean that states would rely on other means to deal with them. First, states could use sanctions or other tools in order to persuade. They could also use proxies or a light footprint approach in order to avoid being entangled in these situations. More probably, great powers would choose to intervene indirectly in order to contain potentially threatening consequences for a particular areas or for themselves.

Conclusion: France in Mali

That’s why France would certainly choose not to intervene directly in Mali. More accurately, one would not expect France to rely on the same assets and on the same course of action than in Libya. First, political elites are willing to avoid any accusation of attempting to reassert control in a previous colony. Second, external threats are seen as less important than domestic issues. Third, further cuts in the defense budget would weigh on capabilities to act. Fourth, France’s political leaders are unwilling to use force by fear of potential reprisals on French hostages. It seems that we forgot the very necessity of deterrence in that particular case. If France intends to remain a global power (albeit with reduced capabilities), it would be critical to remember the political message the use of force may send to both adversaries and partners. Because force means determination, it would be regrettable to lock ourselves in the binary alternative of fear vs. posture.

That assessment remains true today, where western countries and the international liberal order they managed to build is put at risk by extremists movements threatening to either destabilize a given area or to wage a campaign of attacks against western or western-supported societies. Furthermore, the rise of the « rest » – while not a threat – is giving birth to a world in which we have to recognize the plurality of cultures, norms and values.

An important caution is needed before outlining my main argument. I was raised in a country mostly secure in the sense that no external state threatens it (to be fair, I remember having been scared by the risk of a nuclear armaggedon when I was a child). I’m aware of the fact that today’s threats are also a matter of perception. But I would not discard them, since the actors behind those threats are real, and have the capabilities to strike. But, make no mistakes: I’m not an alarmist and I despise those so-called « pundits » who raise the specter of catastrophic attacks in order to gain more audience. I despise them just as those who demonstrate constant blindness and indulgence toward the risk of real attacks.

Deterrence: Managing threats

In the April issue of Contemporary Security Policy, Thomas Rid wrote a highly scholarly and insightful piece about the way deterrence functions in Israel’s security strategy. Basically, deterrence is a way for Israel to manage « current security » threats, i.e. bomb attacks or rockets lobbed by the Hezbollah, Hamas or other non-state organizations. Thomas explains that Israel is experiencing for a long time a kind of ‘postmodern’ deterrence, relying on punishment and reprisals designed to enforce several norms. By making its action both more predictable and more unreasonable (or, more accurately, by shaping perceptions toward those conclusions), Israel is able to establish and enforce « rules of the game » which guarantee that threats to its security remain relatively low and manageable. Of course, that strategy is not free from contradictions. But the whole strategic realm is made of contradictions which strategists and policymakers  alike are tasked to balance.

The main problem of that particular approach is its interference with the mainstream western strategic culture which values decisive victory and a subsequent strategy of annihilation. There are many reasons which could explain that preference. I do not aim to explore here its many historical, societal, cultural and political roots. Suffice to say that it is deeply internalized and plays a great role in shaping strategic choices.

Nevertheless, the US is experiencing a shift toward a more coherent and comprehensive approach to deal with « extremists » threat. The very notion of deterrence itself has been used by strategists and policymakers since 9/11. In the war against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, a strategy of attrition has been progressively adopted and implemented. In a sense, the so-called « shadow wars« , their other political opportunities notwithstanding, are a first step toward the perception that threats can only be managed and not totally and decisively defeated.

Values?: 

In that context, it is important and critical to emphasize the discrepancy between values and actions in France’s strategy to counter « extremists » in the Sahel (and mostly  in Mali). Values are certainly a good point of departure to make political choices. Unfortunately, they often conceal the lack of political will or, worse, poor strategic thinking. Of course, I consider France to have a particular ability to pursue its own national interests on the international stage. But I’d like to underline the importance of the way we perceive threats and the way to manage them. In a sense, we are still locked to an old fashion view of deterrence as mainly a characteristic of the nuclear threat. We conceive the use of force in a sophisticated way, but we avoid to consider that coercion still plays a role in order to prevent further threat. Put otherwise: we consider that, if force is used, deterrence failed.

Of course, context and the way it is perceived matters: neither France nor the US have stakes higher than those raised by the Israeli government. But that doesn’t invalidate the opportunities set up by deterrence. On the contrary, given our perceived interests to remain an influential actor in West Africa, and given our means, such a strategy would be well suited.

In short, Aron remains relevant precisely because he underlines the importance to recognize that a realist alternative is not between winning and losing, but between winning and preventing the other to achieve its political goals (when those goals are opposed to ours). Maybe it is worth remembering that being aware of that is not cynicism. On the contrary, Aron never gave up his hope in a more peaceful world. But that world could not emerge either through the temptation of Empire or through complete abdication. That’s why deterrence, either through attrition, reprisal or interdiction has still a future. Aron once wrote that one of the main way to demonstrate power and to remain in peace is for an actor to honor his bill or to keep his promises.

Whereas many could argue about what they think is « objective reality » (is Hamas an existential threat to Israel? Is Israel a colonial state willing to oppress the Palestinian people?), I deem it more enlightening to focus on a more nuanced approach that could take into account actors’ logic and perceptions. In addition to be more accurate in dealing with the strategic and political issues, it is also more relevant as it is really analytic and neither descriptive nor normative. Furthermore, such an analysis would have to gain a better understanding of the way those logic act in a dialectical way toward each other.

Hamas:

After « Cast Lead », it is highly plausible that the Hamas leadership understood that is was in its own interest to avoid any provocation toward Israel. Since it has become the ruling party in Gaza after the 2006 elections, Hamas had to navigate a very narrow line. On the one hand, avoiding any reprisal from Israel, fearing that the latter would be able to devastate the strip and endanger Hamas’ capability to provide public services and to act as an effective government. That explains why the number of rockets fired on Israel decreased significantly. At the same time, Hamas struggled to prevent the rise of more extremist groups (like the Islamic Jihad) and even cracked down on Salafis. On the other hand, those groups openly challenged Hamas whose legitimacy relies on its status as the representative of the Palestinian people’s resistance to Israel.

In the wake of the Arab uprisings, the hypothesis would be that Hamas attempted to seize the opportunity presented by the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in neighboring Egypt. In addition, the demise of ruling powers in that very area meant that it became a path for funneling weapons and cash to Gazan Salafis. Thus, they were able to strike Israel and put Hamas in front of an alternative: relying on coercion in order to suppress the rising and competing Salafis groups (but with the risk of losing its credibility as a « resistance movement »), or tolerating the attacks in the hope that Israel would not retaliate (but with the risk of being held accountable by the latter).

Thus when Israel zeroed in on Hamas, the rank and file in the organization pressured the leadership to give up restraint and to resume attacks. If president Morsi officially condemned and criticized Israel, his support to Hamas did not go further. At the end of the day, the changing internal and regional environment was perceived by Hamas leadership as an incentive to act. Internal contest and regional changes seemed to provide the organization with new opportunities to exploit in order to gain a better position in the confrontation with Israel. The goal was not to break the siege of Gaza, since in many ways that siege is useful for the organization’s political aims and financial interests. But it was certainly to force regional actors to act in order to demonstrate to the Israeli leadership that it would not be able to break Hamas’ rule on Gaza.

Israel

To some political elites, Hamas’ political goals pose an existential threat. In addition, if the size of Gaza makes it vulnerable, that is also true for Israel, whose territory can be hit by rockets launched from the coastal strip.

Facing such a threat, strategic calculus coupled with strategic culture led to a strategy of attrition. That strategy aimed to further pressure Hamas as well as more radical groups in order to disrupt those groups’ capabilities to hit Israel with medium-to-short range missiles. At the same time, that strategy was coupled with an information campaign designed to frame the narrative of the conflict for both domestic and international audiences. Showing its willingness and its determination to act, Netenyahu’s government proved able to manage the threat posed by Hamas. Lastly, even if that system is not totally perfect, the Iron Dome deflected the threats posed by rockets and missiles on the Israeli population.

There’s an important point here: that strategy is not aimed to win « decisively’ against the Palestinian organization. That is nearly impossible, since there’s only two courses of action that could lead to that outcome: either Israel would prove capable to cut Hamas’ support among the Gazans (which would necessitate an « hearts and minds » campaign directed toward the Palestinians , which doesn’t seem possible given the growing gap and cleavage between the IDF and the population and which is also not deemed desirable nor achievable by the Israeli government), or Israel would decide to cut a deal with the organization (which is highly improbable given the fact that the latter’s legitimacy relies on its rejection of any long-term deal with Israel). Put otherwise: there’s little hope for Israel to achieve any decisive political objective against  Hamas, or at least this is the main perception.

In short, Israel’s strategy consists in dealing with Hamas thus opening the question of what to do on the long run. There’s a lesson to draw from that short (and sometimes questionable) analysis. The alternative in war is not necessarily between winning and losing. Sometimes, it is more reasonable and more rational to deal with a threat or with an adversary by preventing him to reach his political objectives. Attrition is particularly well suited for that kind of strategic attitude. It can either lead to the adversary’s exhaustion (or isolation) or to its complete annihilation. More probably, it is able to maintain a high level of pressure against him, thus preventing him to hit and to harm. It is also truer when combined with deterrence, both by reprisals and by interdiction. Of course, that cannot replace a long-term reflection on how to put an end to the conflict. In that particular case, and given the role played by mutual perceptions, it is unlikely to see that outcome before minds are able to change in a deep way.

Stéphane Taillat

Classé dans:Etudes Stratégiques, in English too ]]> http://coinenirak.wordpress.com/2012/11/24/israel-and-hamas-a-strategic-analysis/feed/ 1 staillat http://coinenirak.wordpress.com/2012/11/05/perils-and-promises-of-drones-a-strategic-appraisal/ http://coinenirak.wordpress.com/2012/11/05/perils-and-promises-of-drones-a-strategic-appraisal/#comments Mon, 05 Nov 2012 17:00:34 +0000 staillat http://coinenirak.wordpress.com/?p=1249 Lire la suite →]]> A short post to outline several ideas and thoughts about the use of drones in the US strategy against Al Qaeda.

1) we have to grasp the political significance of Obama’s choice to rely on drones and SOF in order to « disrupt, dismantle » Al Qaeda:

The president narrowed its political goals: fighting Al Qaeda and its allies or affiliates without relying on state building, and without committing too much troops on the ground in a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach. Instead, Obama understood his role as fighting the jihadist organization in order to deter further attacks against the US.

2) that goal led to a new strategy:

Using drones strikes as well as SOF raids (or other more conventional assets) is done through an attrition strategy. The main mechanism through which attrition is supposed to work is to inflict casualties to the enemy organization faster than it can replace it. It is not primarily intended to exhaust the adversary, but to raise its costs to pursue the war. In other words, exhaustion is only one possible outcome. At the other end of the spectrum, complete annihilation is another one.

3) physical and psychological effects of drone strikes:

Drones are not used only to inflict physical casualties, thus undermining the operational capabilities of AQ/its affiliates to control effectively a territory, to keep safe havens or to prepare further attacks. They also have psychological impacts, mostly on the networks, and especially on its weaker nodes, that is those actors amenable to leave the fight, or to hide in order to escape the strikes. As such, the strategy which relies on drones is not only an attrition strategy, but also a part of a more comprehensive deterrence strategy. That’s what « disrupting » means: inflicting systemic blows that undermine the operational capabilities of a given network as a whole.

On the material side of the effects, drones have proven highly effective as a decapitation tool. On the psychological one, it’s difficult to really assess the effects, but it seems that drones, used in addition to other tools, may have produced subversive effects.

4) Pressuring Al Qaeda?

The problem is the relevance of such a strategy on the long run. A « pure » attrition strategy would likely lead to a slaughter, since AQ and its affiliates have been able to reinforce or to replace the losses. What could be the threshold that would trigger an annihilation, or exhaustion of AQ? The « search and destroy » experience in Vietnam should remember us that relying only on measurable metrics (especially in terms of « body count ») is fraught with cognitive biases.

On the other hand, a « pure » deterrence strategy is difficult to wage against non-state actors, and especially « irregular » organizations. It is thus possible to limit AQ’s capabilities to wage a campaign of attacks, but up to a point. Zero-risk is not really a realist option.

That’s why using drones strikes – both more precise and less costly than conventional counterinsurgency i.e. as much efficient as a strategy can be – should prove more relevant on the long run if used as a way to sustain the pressure against AQ and its affiliates. The goal would not be to dismantle or to disrupt (not to speak of neutralize), but instead to compel AQ to stay on a defensive stance (or, at least, a less offensive one).

In addition, relying on drones and SOF raids, while highlighting other potential costs (in diplomatic terms since it is necessary to achieve an agreement with the host nation, with the very exception of failed states maybe; in terms of domestic support since both the military institutions and the public opinion could raised several political obstacles, in terms of local support since drones may have a negative impact on the local population), should not be thought as a silver bullet. Furthermore, relying on such an indirect way to deal with AQ should not let the military institutions to forget its institutional experience from Iraq and Afghanistan.

In short, that strategy has to adapt to the evolving character of the war, which is both conditioned by internal calculus and political bargaining and of course, by the adversary’s strategy.

Stéphane TAILLAT

As far as I can remember, the biblical story of David vs. Goliath has never been to me the story of a bright victory of weakness against strength On the contrary, I’ve always thought that David was the strongest of both opponents. Not only does he rely on the will of God but he also draws upon his cleverness in order to defeat his adversary. It’s not so counter-intuitive as it could appear at a first glance: power doesn’t necessarily imply strength or having much more material capabilities.

From « war » to « logic of war »:

In the last issue of Res Militaris, Laure Bardiès wrote a smart and insightful piece in which she argues to give up descriptive categories  and instead promote analytical ones in order to better explain and understand contemporary wars.

Basically, her arguments draw on weberian sociology to build ideal-types that could account for the logic of actors (by which she means not only the belligerents, but also different actors, pursuing different and sometimes diverging interests, inside a political-military apparatus). The reason is clear: categories we are used to employ in order to depict contemporary conflicts are either too descriptive (i.e. tied to the formal characteristics of wars) or too normative (i.e. shaped by one actor’s perception of the other). « Asymmetric » war (war between a « weak » and a « strong ») falls in the former while « irregular » war (war between state-soldiers and terrorists/insurgents) is clearly typical of the latter.

She proposes to look further: according to Clausewitz, war is waged for political purpose. Means as well as ends are a function of the significance of the fight given by the actor. It could thus be possible to design ideal types that could account for their logic, the dynamic interplay between them and their evolution in time. Accordingly, she offers to transform the categories of « total war » and « limited war » into « total war logic » and « limited war logic ».

In order to build her ideal type, she suggests to analyze the relations between issues, objectives and means.

Thus, a « total war logic » would exist when an actor has absolute issues at stake (like its survival), design accordingly its objectives as imposing its will whatever the costs and thus relies on every means at its disposal in order to do so. On the contrary, a « limited war logic » would be characterized by relative issues, objectives restricted by a threshold beyond whom costs would overcome the expected benefits, and  thus means would be quantitatively restricted.

Eventually, Laure Bardiès concludes by articulating a dynamic interaction between those logic:  what if an actor has a « limited war logic » against his opponent waging (in its own perception) a « total war »? Obviously, the latter has the advantage owing to its greater capacity to abide costs. In addition, she argues that the real difference between both logic lies in two criteria

1) the determination to pursue the armed struggle

2) the proportion of means effectively engaged in comparison to the total amount of means at the actor’s disposal

Applying « war logic » to the US War in Iraq:

Empirically, it is difficult to apply that model. Of course, this is precisely the function that ideal type is supposed to perform: to serve as a reference in order to analyze contingent situations.  No historical configuration would exactly fit with one of the ideal type, the greatest probability being that it would be situated somewhere between both poles of the spectrum (or, more precisely, that it would shift from one to another due to the dynamic characteristic of war). But, if we take the three elements of the model, the Iraq war (as waged by the Bush administration) would fit in the following table:

In that case, issues and objective are congruent with a « total war logic » while means comply more with the « limited war logic ». Indeed, issues were raised at a very high level, with the Bush administration arguing that Saddam Hussein could use weapons of mass destruction or funnel them to terrorist groups in order to wage war on the US soil. Objectives were also designed as absolute: first to destroy the regime and then to transform Iraq in a stable, democratic State allied with the US in its struggle against Al Qaeda. On the contrary, means were mostly limited, both in the invasion phase and in the subsequent stage of occupation (the main strategy during the first years being to withdraw troops as soon as possible).

In order to understand that gap, one should examine the very reasons of the war against Saddam’s regime, which have nothing to do with the real threat it posed to the US (even if Bush and his counselors thought it could be a real threat at the time), but more with several ideologically biased perspectives about  the threat. First, the invasion was supposed to prevent (or preempt in the Bush’s rhetoric) attack from Saddam and second to deter any aggression. Instead of assessing the threat of non state actors, the Bush administration at the time was more concerned by the threat posed by rogue states. Second, that move was a way to fix the problem posed by the the regime of sanctions imposed on Iraq. Third, the war was also a mean to restore the status of the US after 9/11.

That gap could also be explained by the way Donald Rumsfeld and several strategists in the Pentagon thought war should be now waged: with limited, but more lethal and decisive, means. In their view, technological advance coupled with operational excellence would suffice to overthrow the regime.

Eventually, ideology had a vote: neoconservative Weltanschauung – which envisioned democracy as the « natural regime » of any society – coupled with the administration’s reluctance to nation building led to a poorly planned post-Saddam Iraq.

With regards to the means, they were mostly limited both in quantity (troops deployed on the ground were mostly insufficient to perform the task of securing Iraq after the fall of the regime and achieving Bremer’s revolutionary agenda) and in quality (meaning here that the strategy was oriented toward withdrawal).

Incoherent strategy: 

That discrepancy between issues and objectives on the one hand, and means on the other hand led to strategic incoherence.  In order to understand the difficulties encountered by the US military in Iraq, one has to add two critical variables.

1. the dominant elements of the strategic and military culture insist on the necessity to achieve a decisive victory. In other words, even a « limited war logic » can imply the maximum use of force in order to win a quick victory (and one could add: all the more decisive that issues and objectives are « limited »). In the case of Iraq, that logic implied to deliver the maximum amount of force in order to topple the regime. The problem is that, once Saddam defeated, a much harder challenged emerged, which would have requested a much larger amount of political patience and strategic flexibility. Consequently, in the absence of a decisive victory in the other goal (building a stable and democratic Iraq), the Bush administration shifted to denial. That produced a lowering of the expectations regarding the final stage to achieve before withdrawing and releasing sovereignty to the Iraqi government. Hence, the hope raised by a temporary surge of force in order to achieve a decisive victory against insecurity. The fact that the Bush administration took such a long time to accept the challenge of the task and the reality suggests that the « total war logic » was almost rhetorical. The fact that it accepted to lower its expectations suggests that the logic became less and less « total » and more and more « limited » with time (and especially after Bush secured a second mandate). Nevertheless, the capabilities of the US to endure such a military effort on the long run is tied to both determination (especially regarding the political leaders and the officers deployed on the ground) and endurance (with regards to military capabilities to sustain a high tempo rotation cycle).
2. given that first element, it is worth to underline the link between that culture of « decisive and quick victory » on the one hand and the reliance on a strategy of annihilation on the other hand. That link is in no way necessary. Insurgents’ strategy suggests that a « total war logic » can instead rely on a strategy of attrition, in order to raise the opponent’s costs until he decides to give up. Facing such a strategy, the Bush administration (and the theater commander) could not longer rely on the sole use of military force in order to win the decision. If the surge achieved several of the objectives set by the administration, it was a consequence of multiple factors, in which the US strategy is only  a part (even if I argue that it is the most important as it benefited from other political dynamics at play which it partially shaped in return). Although eventually that strategy morphed into a « hybrid » form, associating annihilation goals (dismantling « irreconcilable » actors) and attrition means (the use of SOF raids in order to disrupt AQI’s organization and leadership).

Time and interests:

That model is highly significant if one considers the very importance of time and interests. Actually, interests are what shape issues and objectives. Those interests lie in various actors and can take several forms: material as well as ideological, bureaucratic as well as corporate. In some case, they even can affect the whole society (when survival is at stake). But that doesn’t imply those interests to be stable or able to determinate issues and objectives in a strict causal way. A narrower view tends to show how the margin of maneuver for political leaders is more important than one would expect. Notwithstanding, interests play a role in limiting or raising issues.

But that’s also a function of time: the longer a conflict, the more the tendency to shift from one logic to the other. In the case of the war waged by the Bush administration in Iraq, determination and stubbornness was a byproduct of high issues and unrealistic objectives. But determination translated into denial and did not lead to raise the level of means deployed in Iraq, with the very exception of the surge. But Bush’s decision to escalate is not a proof a a « total war logic », it has more to do with the bias toward the need to achieve decisive victory. On issues and objectives, time tended to lower Bush’s expectations and focused his attention on more limited objectives in Iraq.  Quite the opposite, Obama’s narrowing of issues and objectives fit more with the « total war logic »: by elevating the real objective of the US toward dismantling Al Qaeda and escalating drones strikes and SOF raids, the 44th president showed his willingness and determination to achieve victory.

In short, the Iraq war case study suggests that means are not necessarily determined by issues and objectives, but by other factors. Among them is the perception of what military force can achieve in terms of military and political effects. In return, that false perception gave way to a misleading assessment on those effects, leading to the belief that the US should avoid long term commitment on the ground in the near future.

To conclude, the war waged in Iraq by the Bush administration may fit the « war logic » model proposed by Laure Bardies. Indeed,both  determination and the relative level of means are  a function of the duration of the conflict. But, as her model deals more with the coherence between issues, objectives and means, it is worth to complete it with intermediary variables that would help to explain and understand the disjunction between those elements. In short, her work is the first step toward a better understanding of today’s dynamics of conflict. Further researches programs should focus on relevant question as the supposed role of the public opinion – or more accurately, its perception by political elites – in shaping strategic decision; while mine are more focused on the way « war logic » is an important component in the process of shaping political and military effects.. Because not only is strategy a bridge between ends and means, but its function is to generate effects.

« I think we ought to have a draft. I think if a nation goes to war, it shouldn’t be solely be represented by a professional force, because it gets to be unrepresentative of the population (…) I think if a nation goes to war, every town, every city needs to be at risk. You make that decision and everybody has skin in the game »

Autrement dit: le retour à la conscription.

Or, voilà bien quelque chose d’étonnant: l’établissement d’une force entièrement professionnelle en 1973 (All-Volunteer Force) répondait au soucis des décideurs militaires de reprendre le contrôle de l’outil militaire des mains des politiques qu’ils estimaient être responsables du désastre vietnamien. En cause: la micro-gestion, l’élévation artificielle des enjeux et la pression de McNamara ou de Johnson sur les chefs d’Etat-major (et même si on s’en tient à la ligne définie par Henry McMaster qui estime que ces derniers ont manqué à leur devoir en se taisant). La constitution d’une force professionnelle ainsi que la complexification des mécanismes de levée des réserves devaient permettre aux décideurs militaires d’empêcher toute interventionnisme. Dans la lignée de la doctrine Powell, les militaires s’érigeaient ainsi en arbitre de l’usage de la force, usurpant les prérogatives de la sphère politique (et même si on considère les sphères politiques et militaires comme distinctes sans être réellement séparées).

Après 10 années d’interventionnisme, certains tenant de l’école de la « suprématie militaire » considèrent qu’ils doivent non seulement reprendre le contrôle de l’outil militaire, mais également assurer que soit garanti le soutien de l’opinion publique. Cela répond à l’un des mythes dominant au sein de la société militaire: celui qui explique la défaite par le manque d’implication de la société (ou de la « Nation » pour reprendre la terminologie souvent utilisée) à cause des médias, de la trahison ou de la microgestion du pouvoir politique. Lier étroitement Nation et Armées est vu comme naturel (l’Armée est fait pour gagner les guerres de la Nation, c’est même la définition que se donne l’Army, tandis que la Nation compose l’Armée) et doit permettre de garantir un soutien sans faille de l’opinion domestique.

C’est d’ailleurs l’argument repris par McChrystal:

« We’ve never done that in the United State before; we’ve never fought an extended war with an all- volunteer military. So what it means is you’ve got a very small population that you’re going to and you’re going to it over and over again (…) Because it’s less than one percent of the population… people are very supportive but they don’t have the same connection to it. »

Bien entendu, c’est une voix qui n’est certainement pas dominante (puisque penser la sphère militaire comme unitaire est une erreur, à rebours de ce que voudraient faire croire de nombreux officiers), mais qui se fait entendre de plus en plus au sein de certains cercles. Elle montre que restent tenaces certains poncifs. Mais au-delà des préjugés, il est intéressant de saisir l’enjeu d’une telle demande (qui a peu de chance d’aboutir évidemment): il s’agit de lier véritablement le sort des armes (sur un théâtre expéditionnaire lointain) et celui de la société…

Loin de moi l’idée de ne pas saisir ce qui peut animer une telle demande, au-delà des préjugés et des poncifs sur les « civils »: il s’agit de mettre fin aussi à cette dichotomie spatio-temporelle expérimentée par beaucoup en Irak et en Afghanistan (et qu’illustre aussi le sort des vétérans aux Etats-Unis)… Etre mieux compris en quelque sorte. Certes, cela ne doit pas empêcher de rappeler la hiérarchie qui doit exister entre les sphères politiques et militaires, et de prendre conscience que l’absence de menaces réelles ou d’ennemis identifiés  rend moins pertinente l’existence de la conscription…

1. Sur l’envoi de 10 000 Marines dans le Helmand en 2009. L’auteur montre que tous à Washington, ainsi que McChrystal d’ailleurs, savent que le déploiement de troupes supplémentaires à Kandahar serait plus pertinent. Au lieu de cela, le général Nicholson est envoyé dans cette province minée par l’insurrection mais ne représentant que 1% de la population du pays. On peut certes y trouver un enjeu: mettre fin à la culture de pavot qui alimenterait les Taliban (R. Holbrooke soulignant que l’essentiel du soutien financier vient plutôt de donateurs des pays du Golfe), faire pression sur les dirigeants corrompus d’une province que les Britanniques n’ont pu pacifier, démontrer enfin la validité des tactiques de « contre-insurrection ». Il n’en reste pas moins que Kandahar est un objectif plus valable, non seulement parce qu’il s’agit de la troisème ville du pays, mais également en raison de sa situation de carrefour. Ce qui frappe sont les raisons avancées pour justifier le choix du Helmand: le refus des Canadiens de se faire épauler par les Américains (les Canadiens considérant que la sécurité s’est améliorée à Kandahar), la crainte d’aliéner les populations locales (Kandahar étant une cité symbolique pour les Pachtounes), mais surtout la demande expresse des Marines (via le général Conway lui-même) de déployer l’ensemble des moyens organiques d’une Force Expéditionnaire, bref de disposer d’un « Marinestan ».
2. Concernant la lutte contre la culture du pavot, on observe un écart -si ce n’est un fossé- entre les logiques des experts locaux, celles du Département d’Etat et celle de USAID. Ainsi, les spécialistes de la région recommandent de favoriser la culture du coton et l’industrie textile. USAID et le Département d’Etat considèrent au contraire qu’il faut transformer la région vers une agriculture de fruits et agrumes destinés à l’exportation. Les moyens qui sont alloués aux experts de la région et aux bonnes volontés locales sont extrêmement réduits, et on voit comment les représentants d’USAID s’enfoncent dans leur raisonnement, estimant que -dans l’attente du développement des vergers- il faut occuper la main d’oeuvre du Helmand à la construction de routes, ou bien favorisant les politiques d’épandage de défoliants dans les champs de pavot. Au bout du compte, les retards pris, l’insuffisance des moyens financiers et l’aveuglement bureaucratique conduisent non seulement à favoriser le pavot mais aussi à attiser la méfiance des agriculteurs locaux vis à vis des Américains (militaires, agences gouvernementales ou ONG) et même des représentants de Kaboul.

Ces deux exemples, hâtivement brossés, posent question. Ils montrent que, en dépit de la circulation accrue des informations entre le théâtre et Washington, l’enchevêtrement des logiques divergentes entre des acteurs multiples conduit soit à l’absence de décision, soit à l’élaboration de stratégies inefficaces voire contre-productives. Le deuxième enseignement, lié au premier, insiste sur l’éloignement géographique et social entre le terrain et Washington: la prise d’une décision et sa mise en oeuvre ne sont en rien linéaires. Il faut tenir compte de la médiatisation imposée par les acteurs et la distance. On peut certes arguer des lourdeurs bureaucratiques, des différences de perception, des logiques corporatistes. Mais c’est surtout l’existence de deux espaces distincts sans être séparés, de deux logiques (celle qui prévaut pour les acteurs sur place, celle qui anime les décideurs à Washington) qui démontre à quel point on ne peut simplement répliquer telles quelles des décisions et des stratégies décidées en haut lieu. Comment, en dépit des discours sur « la localisation de la contre-insurrection et de la stabilisation », le principe de subsidiarité n’est pas aussi simple à mettre en oeuvre.

La question posée est celle des évolutions observables dans les politiques, les stratégies, les doctrines et les tactiques américaines. En effet, on ne peut nier un effort d’adaptation dans tous ces domaines entre l’invasion de 2003 (voire les attentats du 11 septembre) et aujourd’hui. Toutefois, le scepticisme règne quant à la profondeur et à la pérennité de ces processus. Je renvoie notamment à David Ucko ici et là. Le principal obstacle consiste à analyser ces processus comme si ils n’en formaient qu’un seul. Certes, ils sont liés et relativement interdépendants, mais il me semble que l’on peut les découper pour mieux comprendre en quoi ils fonctionnent selon des logiques bien différentes.

1. L’adaptation des politiques, des stratégies et des institutions militaires relève d’une logique interne à l’appareil de Défense des Etats-Unis et, plus largement, au constant ajustement de la politique étrangère américaine depuis la fin de la guerre froide.  Dans une certaine mesure, les réformes accomplies restent superficielles, les stratégies répondent davantage à la pression exercée par la sphère politique sur les décideurs militaires. Enfin, il faut tenir compte des pressions internes provenant des élites et, dans une mesure plus difficile à quantifier, de l’opinion domestique. A titre d’exemple, l’insistance du Pentagone à vouloir des institutions adaptées aux menaces dites « irrégulières » n’est pas neuve, mais elle ne suscite que des ajustements non-significatifs qui renvoient au soucis des top brass de répondre à la demande politique en fonction de la manière dont ils perçoivent leurs intérêts.
2. L’élaboration doctrinale est plus complexe. Elle a donné lieu à une refonte profonde des doctrines et des concepts, processus qui est toujours en cours d’ailleurs. Ce phénomène dépend davantage de dynamiques internes aux institutions, et notamment à la rivalité entre groupes de pression qui pourraient se découper entre « réformateurs », « conservateurs » et « modérés ». Le mot d’ordre principal est celui de l’adaptation (en rapport avec le premier niveau). Il se manifeste par une volonté de certes « coller » au contexte des guerres contemporaines, mais également de rester le plus pertinent possible dans la concurrence entre organisations. A ce niveau, les acteurs sont partagés entre ceux qui font preuve de réflexivité et saisissent consciemment ces enjeux, et ceux qui adhèrent aux nouveaux concepts comme à des mythes essentiels ou à des solutions stratégiques.
3. L’adaptation tactique est un processus organique aux unités déployées sur le terrain. Elle est presque essentiellement fonctionnelle (c’est à dire qu’elle cherche à répondre aux défis du contexte conflictuel), mais se trouve comme saisie par les enjeux des deux autres niveaux. La circulation des savoirs et des savoirs-faire qui en forme la clé de voûte est essentiellement horizontale et, lorsqu’elle se trouve liée au niveau supérieur, elle fonctionne plutôt du bas vers le haut.

Cette distinction de logiques (politiques, institutionnelles ou fonctionnelles) se comprend dès lors que l’on saisit qu’au fond il s’agit de deux espaces-temps bien distincts, sans être séparés. Les décideurs politiques et militaires agissent dans une logique de temps de paix, ce qui permet de les analyser selon les modèles « classiques » de Stephen Rosen ou de Barry Posen. Les unités déployées sur le terrain agissent dans une logique de temps de guerre, ce qui correspond davantage aux travaux d’un Bruce Gudmusson par exemple.

A cela, on peut ajouter une réflexion: les officiers et militaires sur le terrain se trouvent face à des objectifs politiques définis de manière ambitieuse ou floue. Laissés à eux-mêmes, ils développent leurs propres tactiques et tendent aussi à vouloir peser sur l’élaboration stratégique (notamment à travers le groupe des « réformateurs » et à partir du moment où les premiers officiers supérieurs ou généraux ayant fait leurs armes en Irak se retrouvent à des postes de responsabilité au sein de leurs institutions).

Enfin, on ne peut oublier qu’il existe des ponts entre ces trois niveaux d’analyse. C’est le cas notamment d’individus tel que le général David Petraeus. Bien qu’intéressé aux trois processus, on voit cependant que ce dernier reste orienté essentiellement par les deux premiers… Logiques de guerre et logiques de paix s’entremêlent ainsi, mais sans jamais se confondre.